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ABSTRACT 
 
This  article  is  a  discussion  of  the  core  importance  of  foreign  direct  investment  in  the 
transformation  of  the  Polish  economy.    The  authors  have  researched  this  topic  for  nearly 
twenty years and have previously published many articles on the topic.  The paper discusses the 
“grand failures” of the former system; the key role played by Leszek Balcerowicz and his team 
of both Polish and foreign advisors; the main components of economic reform; and describes 
FDI inflows since the 1990’s.  The paper focuses on FDI in 2011 with a discussion of a current 
FDI project—Intrall Rus. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Foreign Direct Investment, more commonly known as FDI, occurs with the purchase of 
“the physical assets or a significant amount of the ownership (stock) of a company in another 
country to gain a measure of management control.”  Ordinarily, FDI inflows are counted from a 
10 percent stock ownership in a company abroad.  FDI is distinguished from straight portfolio 
investment (also called passive investment) that does not involve obtaining a degree of control 
in  a  company.    Examples  of  portfolio  investment  involve  the  purchase  of  corporate  debt 
securities, stocks, bonds, interest-bearing bank accounts, treasury bills, and notes.  Portfolio 
investment  has  held  a  clearly  secondary  position  in  Poland  in  terms  of  both  economic 
development and transition. 
 
Professor  Jack  Behrman,  a  consultant  to  the  United  Nations  Centre  on  Science  and 
Technology for Development, is a leading and long-time expert in foreign direct investment.  Dr. 
Behrman has identified both positive and negative impacts of foreign direct investment inflows     International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences 
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on host countries.  In fact, many of these impacts are especially relevant to Poland.  Among the 
positive impacts he lists: 
 
  Increased domestic capital formation; 
  Technology and management skill transfer; 
  Regional and sectoral development; 
  Fostering internal competition and entrepreneurship; 
  Favorable effect on balance of payments; and 
    Increased domestic employment, especially in lagging or “sunset” industries, such as 
those  that  use  outdated  and  obsolete  technologies  or  employ  low-wage,  low-skill 
employees.  In Poland, they may include steel, coal, and shipbuilding. 
 
One of the main reasons for the emphasis in Poland on attracting foreign capital and 
Foreign Direct Investment [FDI] into the Polish economy was that there were few domestic 
options available in 1989 for a rapid and radical transformation of the Polish economy that all 
parties agreed would be absolutely necessary.  Why did the Polish economy essentially collapse 
in the period 1988-1989?  Why did the system of state central planning, also known as the 
Command-Rationing System (CRM), itself so utterly collapse?  The answer to these questions 
lies in an analysis and recognition of the “four grand failures” of the CRM which were exhibited 
both in Poland and in many nations in the region.  These included: 
 
1.  Failure to create economic value or to improve the standard of living for the average 
Pole; 
2.  Failure to provide adequate individual and organizational incentives; 
3.  Failure to “measure up” to comparative economies, not only those advanced capitalist 
economies in the West, but also several “fraternal” socialist economies in Central and 
Eastern Europe (most notably, Hungary and Czechoslovakia — later the Czech Republic 
― and Slovenia); and 
4.  Failure to satisfy basic consumer needs, essentially creating an unofficial dollarization of 
the  Polish  economy  through  the  existence  of  a  large,  open,  “semi-official,”  and 
surprisingly efficient “black market,” and the existence of “dollar” stores and shops such 
as the ubiquitous PEWEX shops.  (Hunter & Ryan, 2006). 
 
This article is a summary report on the issues surrounding Foreign Direct Investment in 
the Polish economy.  It is based largely on primary academic research conducted over the past 
twenty years and a field report on a current investment project taking place in Poland in 2011. 
 
2.  BACKGROUND TO ECONOMIC REFORM 
 
Leszek  Balcerowicz  served  as  Deputy  Prime Minister  and Minister  of  Finance  in the 
government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki, who was the first democratically elected non-communist 
Prime Minister in all of Central and Eastern Europe since the end of World War II.  Balcerowicz 
was the chief architect of many of the changes in the economy in Poland which were initiated     International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences 
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after 1989.  (Hunter, Ryan & Shapiro, 2003).  Balcerowicz was the chief architect of “shock 
therapy” in Poland and was especially influenced by the theoretical underpinnings developed 
by Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs and former International Monetary Fund economist David 
Lipton.    Professor  Sachs  had  also  been  instrumental  in  the  fundamental  reform  and 
restructuring of the Bolivian government starting in 1985. 
 
In  the  process  of  economic  transformation,  Balcerowicz  was  also  aided  by  a  well-
prepared transition team consisting of both Polish nationals and so-called “Polonia” (émigré) 
specialists.    The  “Balcerowicz  Team”  consisted,  among  others,  of  Marek  Dąbrowski,  later 
deputy in the Ministry of Finance; Stefan Kawalec, first chief adviser, responsible for financial 
institutions; Janusz Sawicki, responsible for foreign debt negotiations; Andrzej Podsiadło, who 
oversaw  state  enterprises;  and  Grzegorz  Wojtowicz,  first  deputy  chairman  of  the  Polish 
National Bank, and its chairman in 1991.  All were graduates of the Faculty of Foreign Trade of 
the Central School of Planning and Statistics in Warsaw *in Polish, SGPiS+, Poland’s premier 
school for state planning and for producing “policy experts.”  Wojciech Misiąg and Ryszard 
Pazura were also deputies in the Ministry of Finance.  In addition, the team included numerous 
foreign advisers — Jeffrey Sachs, David Lipton, Władysław Brzeski, Stanisław Gomułka, Jacek 
Rostowski, and Stanisław Welisz — and Polish ones — Karol Lutkowski, Andrzej Bratkowski, 
Antoni Kantecki, Adam Lipowski, Andrzej Parkola, and Andrzej Ochocki.  Many of the foreign 
advisers were of Polish origin — so called Polonia academics. 
 
Minister  Balcerowicz  was  a  Professor  of  Economics  at  the  Warsaw  Institute  of 
Economics.  Balcerowicz had graduated from the Faculty of Foreign Trade of the Central School 
of Planning and Statistics — now the Warsaw School of Economics.  Between September 1972 
and January 1974, Balcerowicz had studied business administration at St. John’s University in 
New York City, earning an MBA in 1974.  In 1978, Balcerowicz presciently had established a 
“think tank” composed of ten young economists who would meet regularly to discuss and 
debate potential programs for economic reform.  These informal meetings shaped the program 
of  transformation  adopted  by  the  Mazowiecki  government  and  subsequent  Solidarity 
governments and greatly influenced all post-1989 Polish governments — both positively and 
negatively — in their policy assessments.  (E.g., Sachs, 1993; Balcerowicz, 1995). 
 
2.1 DERIVATIVE TRAITS OF THE COMMAND-AND-CONTROL SYSTEM   
 
Balcerowicz identified certain derivative traits of the command-and-control economy 
that were in need of immediate reform.  These included: 
 
  Administrative price fixing by central authorities; 
  Isolation of domestic producers from foreign markets; 
  Excessive regulation of imports through licenses and import quotas; 
  The  tendency  by  central  planners  to  engage  in  “import  substitution,”  often 
accomplished through rationing, queues, lines, and coupons; 
  “Soft budget constraint” in which targets of planning were revised downward or inputs     International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences 
          January 2012, Vol. 2, No. 1 
ISSN: 2222-6990 
 
597    www.hrmars.com/journals 
 
significantly  increased  in  order  to  meet  plan  targets,  often  based  on  political 
connections and not economic realities; 
  The lack of true commercial and financial institutions; 
  Monopolization of the state sector due to extreme organizational concentration, the 
centralization of organizational rights, and the lack of foreign competition; and perhaps 
most importantly, 
  The lack of any motivation mechanisms for either line managers or workers. 
 
Early in the process of economic transformation, Minister Balcerowicz  decided on a 
strategy  of  transformation  (Hunter  &  Ryan,  2009)  that  would  be  based  on  two  overriding 
considerations:  A market economy was preferred over a centrally planned economy and a 
private market economy was preferred over so-called “market socialism” that was adopted in 
China.  (Hunter & Blodgett, 2009).  The process of economic transformation in Poland is in itself 
quite  instructive  and  has  provided  a  more  general  model  for  other  Central  and  Eastern 
European transition economies. 
 
2.2 PILLARS OF ECONOMIC REFORM  
  
The program was based on five philosophical pillars of economic transformation: (1) 
rapid  transformation  of  the  monocentric  system  of  state  central  planning  into  a  private 
functioning market economy; (2) liberalization of economic functions, especially in relation to 
foreign trade and foreign direct investment (Hunter & Ryan, 1997); (3) privatization of state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) (Hunter & Ryan, 2007); (4) construction of an effective social safety 
net; and (5) mobilization of international financial assistance [IMF, World Bank] to support the 
process.  (Sachs, 1993). 
 
Mirroring  the  Balcerowicz-Sachs  model,  Poland  undertook  the  following  concrete 
actions as the main components of its process of economic reform: 
 
  Liberalizing prices from state control, opening up of the foreign trade régime and the 
Polish  market  to  the  infusion  of  Foreign  Direct  Investment,  and  formalizing  and 
simplifying the requirements for new market entry; 
  Stabilizing inflation, public finance, and foreign debt; 
  Effecting changes in the economy leading to privatization of state property and to an 
increase in the nature and volume of international trade; 
  Remodeling and upgrading the important social-safety net, most especially, the pension, 
education, social insurance, and unemployment systems; 
  Assuring eventual full convertibility of the Polish złoty;   
  Gaining  extensive  external  assistance  (Hunter  &  Ryan,  1998,  pp.  82-84)  of  the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the “London” (private commercial creditors) 
and “Paris” Clubs (public creditors); and 
  Creating  new  market  institutions,  a  commercial  code,  a  revised  tax  code,  private 
property rights (Hunter, Ryan & Nowak, 1995), and a financial and capital market sector     International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences 
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(perhaps, most importantly, the creation of a viable stock market (de la Rosa, Crawford 
& Franz, 2004); Ryan, 1997) and a properly functioning central bank). 
 
2.3 OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE 
 
The Paris Club was comprised of nations that had financed Poland’s public or sovereign 
debt.  The London Club was comprised of private lenders, banks, and brokerage houses that had 
financed Poland’s debt as well.  The Paris Club is composed of 19 permanent members and 
other  official  creditors  who  have  participated  in  some  official  lending.    At  the  start  of  the 
transformation process, Poland’s official Paris Club creditors included Germany ($5.94 billion), 
France ($3.63 billion), Austria ($3.60 billion), the United States ($3.46 billion), Canada ($2.64 
billion), the U.K. ($1.65 billion), Italy ($1.32 billion), and Japan ($0.66 billion).  Brazil, not a 
permanent  member  of the  Paris  Club,  provided  $3.0 billion.   Poland’s  Paris  Club  debt  was 
reduced by a minimum of 50 percent — France and the United Stated agreed to a 70 percent 
reduction.   
    
Poland’s private or commercial London Club debt amounted to an additional $13.2 billion in 
1989.  It was reduced by 45.2 percent, including a 37 percent reduction in interest and a 52 
percent  reduction  in  principal.    Poland’s  largest  London  Club  creditors  included  Salomon 
Brothers  Inc.,  BFG  Bank,  Commerz  Bank,  Swiss  Bank  Corp.,  Lloyd’s  Bank,  BNP,  Standard 
Chartered PLC, Westdeutsche Landesbank, Societe Generale, Bank of America, and Dresdner 
Bank.    Professors  Bossak  and  Kalicki  regard  the  agreement  with  the  London  Club  as  “the 
crowning achievement of not only long and sophisticated negotiations, but also the effect of 
consistent implementation of economic reforms in Poland and their high evaluation by the G-7, 
the Paris Club, the IMF, and the World Bank.”  (Bossak & Kalicki, 1994, p. 203). 
   
Thus,  it  is  important  to  note  that  from  the  outset,  the  attraction  of  foreign  direct 
investment was an important—perhaps indispensible—part of overall economic transformation 
of the Polish economy. (Hunter, Shapiro & Ryan, 2003; Hunter & Ryan, 2001).    
 
Poland  was  initially  considered  as  an  attractive  destination  for  FDI  because  of  the 
existence of three related factors: low cost but qualified labor; long-term market potential or 
yields greater than could be achieved domestically; and access to natural resources.  However, 
once the initial rush to investment had occurred, continued success would be attributable to 
the interrelation of several factors:  few restrictions on FDI would be imposed (Moran, 1998) in 
terms of targeted investments (Moran, 1998); “national treatment” would be offered to FDI, 
regardless of the country of origin; a relatively sound “company law” or commercial code
1 
(Hunter, Ryan & Nowak, 1995) would be created, as well as transparent customs and tariff 
procedures; the Polish government would continue to foster and nurture FDI activities; and 
                                                           
1    Included in these vehicles is the creation of a joint-stock company, wholly owned by 
the state, but managed as if it were a private company.  This was the first—and critical 
step—in creating a capitalist economy from state-ownership. 
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Poland  would  be  required  to  adopt  an  understandable  and  “perceived  as  fair”  tax  code.  
(Hunter & Hrechak, 1993; Hunter & Hrechak, 1994).  All of these factors would be critical in 
assuring Poland’s international competitiveness as a site for FDI.      
 
3.  FDI INFLOWS 
 
According to the Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency [PAIiIZ] since the 
early 1990s, international business has so far invested over USD 100 billion in Poland. (PAIZ, 
2011).  This clearly ranks Poland as a regional leader.  The most significant inflow of FDI could 
be observed in the period 2006-2007, the lowest inflow between 1994 and 1996.   
  
The main investors, which have already located their capital in Poland, are as follows: 
Germany with 16.4% of total FDI amount, the Netherlands with 16.1%, Sweden with 13.44% 
and Luxemburg with 11.14%. 
    
The main objects of FDI were:  financial, legal, and accounting  consulting companies 
(3,013 mln EUR); real estate companies (2,605 mln EUR); trade and companies engaged in 
“repair” (1,455 mln EUR); and industrial processing companies (1,442 mln EUR).  [As of the 
writing of this paper, December 27, 2011, the value of the Euro to the Dollar was 1 Euro equals 
$1.30736.]   
 
   The worldwide economic downturn in 2008-2010 ironically had made Poland a very 
attractive  place  for  FDI.    During  this  period,  Poland  was  seen  as  a  stable  and  growing 
economy—one of the few on the European continent.  (Hunter & Ryan, 2011).  However, by the 
mid-point of 2011, the advantage that Poland had in successfully weathering the worldwide 
economic crisis has largely disappeared.   Stability, which had been a hallmark of Poland’s 
economy  over  the  past  two  to  three  years,  has  largely  returned  to  most  of  the  European 
continent—with the exception of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and perhaps Portugal.  Investors 
could look elsewhere for FDI opportunities and an expanding business environment.     
 
In 2010, foreign direct investment (FDI) in Poland totaled 7.54 billion euros—which was 
2.4 billion lower than 2009.  The Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency had earlier 
projected that FDI would reach almost 10 billion euros in 2010.  Surprisingly, Polish investment 
abroad (FDI outflows) increased in 2010 to 3.78 billion euros from 3.72 billion euros in 2009. [At 
the writing of this paper, May 18, 2011, one euro was valued at $1.462.] However, 2010 should 
not be characterized as a failure either.  As noted by Slawomir Majman of PAIiIZ: 
“In  the  first  quarter  of  2010,  PAIiIZ  was  running  altogether  142  projects 
compared to 82 at the same time last year.  The completion of all the projects 
now under way will within the next few years generate more than 34,000 new 
jobs.  In the first quarter of 2010, 29 projects were signed. 6,000 new jobs will 
emerge from them.  Only 10 projects (creating 2,000 jobs) were signed at this 
time last year.” (Consulate General of the Republic of Poland, 2011). 
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In terms of the future of FDI in Poland, UNCTAD, the United Nations agency for trade 
and development, estimates that global investment flows may rise to $1.5 trillion in 2011, 
followed by an even stronger $2 trillion in 2012.  Poland will certainly benefit from this overall 
improvement in the world economy.   
 
4.  POLAND AND FDI IN 2011 
 
Two  areas  have  been  magnets  to  foreign  investment  in  the  Polish  economy:    the 
automotive industry and service centers of global corporations which have employed qualified 
staff  (especially  involving  language  proficiency)  in  Poland.    Once  again  the  availability  of 
qualified workers in Poland has been noted as the most important pre-condition to attracting 
significant FDI.  The Federation of International Trade Associations reports on the main positives 
for Polish FDI as follows: 
 
“A fast-growing economy, location in central Europe, a multilingual work force 
and cheap labor costs make Poland an internationally attractive country.  Poland 
also enjoys a well managed healthy economy, which is withstanding the crisis 
better than other European countries.  Unlike other Central European countries, 
its population did not have to resort to loans in foreign currencies, in particular 
Swiss, a fact which protects the population from maximum debt.”   (FITA, 2011). 
 
5.  A BRIEF CASE STUDY 
 
One key example of current FDI activity is Russia’s Intrall Rus, which has announced 
plans to build a research center and automotive plant in Pomerania.  The Polish facility is being 
designed to support a Russian operation to construct delivery vans in Stavropol. 
 
After  the  initial  plans  have  been  finalized,  Intrall  Rus  intends  to  construct  a 
manufacturing plant for commercial vehicles, light delivery vans, and all-terrain vehicles.   
 
The  first  stage  of  construction  will  involve  22  million  euros  and  will  consist  of  the 
construction of a research and development (R&D) center for the design of new vehicles.  Total 
investment is expected to top 270 million euros.  The project will begin in the last quarter of 
2011 and the first vehicles are scheduled to be produced in early 2014.   Company officials 
indicate that 2,500 to 5,000 vehicles are expected to be produced each year.  Intrall Rus has 
also indicated that the company is expected employ 50 Polish-trained engineers at the facility 
and 500 to 600 production workers.   A second phase of construction will attempt to link the 
manufacturing process with a variety of components and parts suppliers.       
 
Local authorities in the Pomerania region are full partners in the enterprise, promising 
to  work  with  local  employment  agencies  and  governmental  authorities  in  recruiting  and 
training employees and in cooperative efforts with technical schools and regional universities in 
creating degree and training programs for future staff and management.  Thus, FDI activity may     International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences 
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serve  as  a  model  for  further  cooperative  efforts  that  have  recently  damaged  by  tensions 
between Russia and Poland.  
 
6.  SOME CONCLUSIONS     
 
It is now very obvious that the attraction of FDI into the Polish economy has been a 
mainstay of both political and economic policy.  Without a doubt, the future progress of both 
the political and economic systems will continue to depend on the core attractiveness of Poland 
as a destination for significant investments in Poland in FDI.     
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